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NATIONALISM AS A CONTINGENT EVENT: SOME REFLECTIONS ON  
ETHIO-ERITREAN EXPERIENCE* 
 
Mesfin Araya  
 
 
* This paper is a bare outline of a larger manuscript near completion.  Dr. Mesfin Araya is 
a professor of African and African-American Studies and Director of its Research Center at York 
College, CUNY. 
 
Background 
 What is politically significant and what really attracts scholarly research in any 
nationalism is the awakening of the masses - i.e. the effective transition from elite-based to mass-
based nationalism; this study is concerned with that transition in the Eritrean experience in the 
modern political history of Ethiopia. 
 Eritrea is a multi-ethnic society comprising eight linguistic groups, but historically, the 
great cultural and political divide has been religion - with roughly equal population distribution 
between Christians and Moslems.  From 1890-1941,  the region was an Italian colony; with the 
collapse of the Italian empire in the Horn of Africa, it was "administered" by the British until 
1952, when it joined Ethiopia under a "federal" arrangement, sponsored by the United Nations; 
with the collapse of the "federation" in 1962, Eritrea became a province of Ethiopia; In April 
1993, however, it reemerged as a new nation-state: the referendum, sponsored by the United 
Nations, is said to have resulted in 99.8 percent vote for Independence; the birth of the new 
nation-state has radically redrawn the post-colonial African map, held sacred by the members of 
the Organization of African Unity. 
 The checkered political history of the tiny former Italian colony, British protectorate, 
autonomous region, province of Ethiopia, and finally a new nation-state, seems to raise 
interesting theoretical questions to the student of nations, nationhood, and nationalism: when 
(conceptualized in historical perspective), how, and why, did the Eritrean nationhood become a 
reality?  Was the reality of Eritrean nationhood a thing that developed or a contingent historical 
event?  How deeply rooted and solid is Eritrean national identity?  At a more general level: What 
is Nationalism?  Is its dynamics inherently governed by the qualities of cultural group identities, 
or is it primarily a product of enduring socio-economic forces, entailed by modernity?  What 
does the Eritrean experience in the modern political history of Ethiopia suggest? 
 I was motivated to explore the Eritrean experience in the modern political history of 
Ethiopia by the difficulties I encounter in two areas: the theoretical debate about nations, 
nationhood, and nationalism, and the specific scholarly literature on Eritrean nationalism.  This 
study has two goals: as an investigation of a specific historical case study, it attempts to offer 
some insights to the ongoing theoretical discussions about nationalism; also, it tries to present 
fresh interpretation that claims to provide corrective measures to existing literature on Eritrean 
nationalism. 
Framework of Analysis 
The proliferation of nationalist struggles has given rise to a flurry of activity in theory 
concerning nations, nationhood and nationalism.  Yet nationalism, as an object of scholarship, 
remains elusive, "puzzling about which there is less analytical consensus… Disagreement about 
its origins is matched by uncertainty about its future." (Anderson, 1996:1) 
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 Nationalist movements create, invoke, conjure up, nations where they do not exist to 
justify, legitimize their claims; hence, nationalist struggle is seen as the unfolding spirit of the 
nation, and the nationalists see themselves as the carrier of that spirit.  Having, therefore, a 
necessary functional role, the idea, nation, is inherent to the practice of nationalists.  That 
historical truth need not be surprising.  What remains surprising is that the practical discourse of 
nationalist movements seems to have influenced the theoretical discussions about nations, 
nationhood, and nationalism.  As Rogers Brubaker aptly describes - most theoretical discussions 
about nationalism are indeed discussions of nations.1 To elaborate my argument and reformulate 
the analytical framework adopted in this study, let me outline the perspectives of two dominant 
schools of thought - continuum and modernist. 
 The first is popularly associated with Anthony Smith; although Smith (1986:16) does not 
deny the modern character of Nationalism, he nevertheless, perceives "Ethnie" as the seed of 
nations.  Although the specific emphasis may vary, a number of scholars - e.g. John Armstrong 
(1982), Walker Connor (1994), and John Hutcheson (1994) -- belong to the Continuum school of 
thought, whose central thesis is continuity between a pre-existing, enduring, sense of group 
ethnic/cultural identity and nationalism. There are even those, like Connor, who suggest that 
every ethnic group is a potential political candidate for nationhood, apparently implying the 
likelihood of the disintegration of multi-ethnic societies such as post-colonial Africa. 
 Shared myths, cultural symbols, or ethnic identity, can indeed have a powerful catalyst 
role in nationalist politics, but the dynamics of nationalism is not inherently, necessarily, 
governed by the properties of cultural group identities (Brubaker 1996). Indeed there are 
concrete historical cases that such a theoretical perspective could hardly explain.  There are 
societies with strong cultural solidarity but weak nationalist politics - e.g. Basques, Catalans, 
Corsicans, Kurds, Scots, Sikhs, Tibetans, and Welsh, who have failed to produce their own 
nation-states;  the collapse of the Somalia nation-state is even more a vivid example of the non-
historical correspondence between the so-called "ethnie" and nationalism.  Even among those 
who may be seen as having shared myths and cultural symbols, there was clear historical 
variation;  as historians would tell us, most individuals nationalities in the Hapsburg monarchy 
did not begin to yearn for a separate state until late nineteenth century; nor did the Polish 
produce their own nation-state until 1918.  We also encounter in history societies with weak 
cultural solidarity but strong nationalist politics, nevertheless: the nation-states born out of the 
anti-colonial nationalism in Africa - where culture, ethnic, or linguistic heterogeneity was the 
rule - are indeed good historical examples. 
 The second school of thought, identified as modernist, invariably invokes enduring socio-
political and economic structural forces - social communications (Deutsch 1966), the modern 
state (Michael Mann 1975:44-64), industrialism (Gellner 1983), print capitalism (Anderson 
1991), unequal regional development (Narin 1977) -associated with modernity to account for 
nationalism.  But such a theoretical perspective has also its own inadequacies.  There are those, 
for example, who cite French nationalism without industrialization to counter argue that 
historically nationalism emerged in the absence of modernity;2 nor do nations effortlessly follow 
from modernity; in his prominent historical, sociological, and comparative, study of small-
county nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, Miroslav Hroch (1985) has 
strongly underlined what the modernist school of thought is totally indifferent to:   the historical 
variability of world-timing among those nationalist movements. What is even more - as Lia 
Greenfeld (1992), in her comparative historical study, strongly shows -- modernity may actually 
be the product of nationhood rather than vice versa. The modernist perspective may be helpful to 
account for ethnic elite alienation, and hence the rise of elite-based nationalism - but it fails to 
specify the conditions, or the historical events, that effect the transition to mass-based 
 2 
nationalism:  the vital question of when, how, and why, does the nationalist entrepreneur's' 
construction of nation come to captivate the masses is visibly missing in the theoretical formula 
of the modernist 
 Those two schools of thought - despite their difference in perspective - actually seem to 
fall into a single school of thought: developmentalist perspective, as both treat nationalism as a 
product of underlying, enduring, cultural (continuum approach) or socio-political and economic 
(modernist approach) forces; as a result, both render the concept nation - which is inherent to the 
practice of nationalists  - a reified analytical status - the idea, nation, conceptualized as an entity 
that needs to be defined, as a thing out there that develops3 -- and as Brubaker (1996) rightly 
notes -- it is not a mere coincidence that the theoretical literature is invariably marked by a 
debate on what constitutes nation - objective, and subjective measurements are often invoked 
with little consensus. 
 As far as the literature on Eritrean Nationalism is concerned, certain basic weaknesses 
can be identified.4  It lacks originality, as it is visibly dominated by nation-minded scholars, and 
it is not altogether theoretically coherent.  In a restless search for a justification regarding the 
right of self-determination of the Eritrean people, the literature fruitlessly tries to derive Eritrean 
nationalism from pre-existing Eritrean national identity - hence, the latter is traced to pre-Italian 
colonial period; or Italian Colonialism is said to have laid down the modern socio-political and 
economic foundation for Eritrean national consciousness; and at times, the history of the 
nationalist armed struggle is privileged as the catalyst in the development of Eritrean national 
identity.  Conspiracy theory is also invoked to explain why Eritrea - unlike colonized African 
societies - failed to acquire its own nation-state, or why the Ethio-Eritrean "federation" collapsed 
in 1962. 
 Despite the availability of comparative knowledge on the nature and histories of 
liberation movements in the "Third World," the literature never fails to romanticize the history 
and role of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF); the strength of EPLF's hegemonic 
project is uncritically stressed; EPLF's leadership seen as visionary is said to have carried out 
democratic and social revolution in the Eritrean society; and the historical  solidity of the 
Eritrean national identity is unduly exaggerated. Rather than an object of inquiry, the Eritrean 
nationalist discourse is taken for granted - the Eritrean nationalists themselves being the basic 
reference sources for the nation-minded scholars.  On the whole, the literature is theoretically 
barren and empirically highly biased.  "The progress of historical studies, says Hobsbawm 
(1996:255), is often dangerous to a nationality;" that has not been the case - fortunately to the 
nationalists - with the dominant literature on the modern political history of Eritrea, as the 
outcome has been - to use Patrick Gilkes (1991: 624] apt  phraseology - the production and 
reproduction of "Guerilla Groupie" literature. 
 The work of John Markakis (1990) is indeed an exception.  According to his analytical 
perspective, Eritrean Nationalism was driven by material interests - the increasingly centralizing 
tendencies of the Ethiopian state under the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, the collapse of the 
Ethio-Eritrean "federation", the diversion of Eritrean resources, and the imposition of Amharic 
language, and the protracted armed struggle finally effecting a transformation in the nature of 
Eritrean nationalism.  Although he provides a rich historical evidence, his reductionist materialist 
perspective seems to deprive him of a clear theoretical framework that would have enabled him 
to account for variability in the history of the nationalist movement itself.  What is more, if 
indeed material interests were the driving force of nationalism, the absence, for example, of 
Oromo nationalism under the reign of Haile Selassie would require explanation-as the region 
was the most exploited, dominated, part of Ethiopia.  Material interests, enduring structures, may 
define the larger boundary, but social behavior is not mechanically derived from them, it is rather 
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mediated through processes of social interaction.5  Markakis' work - fashioned after the 
modernist school of thought - fails to theorize on specific historical conjectures, events, 
personalities, that may have played a critical role in molding, shaping, and finally transforming 
the Eritrean experience in the modern political history of Ethiopia.   
 Individuals and groups have multiple identities, none of which are permanently fixed, 
immutable, social categories.  On the contrary, "Time and again," as Max Weber (1968:397-398) 
would remind us, "we find that the concept 'Nation' [rather] directs us to political power." In his 
more detailed work, John Breuilly has elaborated Weber's thesis that nationalism - which draws a 
veil over other group identities - is first and foremost a form of politics (Breuilly 1982).  As such, 
the so-called nation is indeed a 'political fiction'6 constructed by nationalist entrepreneurs 
(Brubaker 1996:16), and it is precisely its power or weakness in practice that we need to explain: 
We should not ask ‘What is a nation’ but rather: how is 
nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized 
within and among states?  How does a nation work as practical 
category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?  What 
makes the use of the category by or against states more or less 
resonant or effective?  What makes the nation-evoking, 
nation-invoking efforts of political entrepreneurs more or less 
likely to succeed?  
 
In order to fully grasp Nationalism, therefore, the practical uses of the category "nation" must 
first be understood: "the ways by which it comes to structure perception, to inform thought and 
experience, to organize discourse and political action(Brubaker:1996:19). 
 I submit that nationalism- as primarily a form of politics- is best understood as a 
contingent event; and being one kind of identity, among multiple and changing group identities, 
it could hardly claim a monopoly status in history.  In what follows I will try to substantiate 
empirically those two interrelated theoretical claims through a critical reading of the checkered 
experience of Eritrean nationalism in the modern political history of Ethiopia. 
The Eritrean Experience in the Modern History of Ethiopia 
Eritrean nationalists do not hesitate to trace the existence of their national identity as far back as 
ancient history of the region.  Adulis, the port of ancient Axum, for example, is treated as a 
symbol of the enduring common history of the country.  Despite Ernest Renan's (1882:8-22)  
caveat emptor  that nationalists are the first to engage in historical distortions, nation-minded 
scholars have uncritically taken the Eritrean nationalist discourse as their point of departure 
rather than as an object of inquiry. 
 On the contrary, until the arrival of the Italians, the region has experienced multiple and 
shifting identities.  In the conflict with the lowland Moslems, Turks, Egyptians, and Italians, the 
highland Christians have invariably stood behind Christian Ethiopia (Abyssinia).  Yet, despite 
religious, linguistic, and cultural unity, they have also fought, depending on the circumstances, 
against each other on the basis of kinship or regional ties. A village traditional chief aptly 
describes the multiple and shifting identities that marked the highland Christian region: 
All the time we unite with our nearest if we come into trouble or conflict.  If it is a 
conflict within the village, gezauti stand against gezauti.  If it is a conflict between 
villages - each village will unite against the other.  If it is a conflict at the province 
level, province will stand against province.  And if the lowland tribes attack us, 
the whole Kebessa (highland) will unite! (Tronvoll1998:124) 
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Although the lowlanders might have had frequent wars with the Christian highland region along 
religious lines, they have never been less fragmented from within along clan and sub-clan ties 
(Nadel 1945:51-93). 
 The Italians brought peace to a region which had otherwise been often marked by 
frequent religious or military warfare, and for the first time created a distinct political boundary, 
laying down the potential institutional infrastructure for what Anderson (1991) would call 
cartographical discourse of nationalism - i.e. a potential political basis for territorial identity.  
The Ethio-Eritrean "federation" - which gave the region an autonomous status - enhanced that 
potentiality for territorial identity.  However, and this point needs to be strongly underlined: 
despite having a distinct political boundary for over seventy years - taking into account Italian 
colonialism, British "Administration", and the period of Ethio-Eritrean "federation" - Eritrean 
nationalism had remained fragmented until post-1974 Ethiopian revolution.  Indeed, the 
transition from alienated nationalism-merely confined to the elite groups- to mass-based 
nationalism is primarily a post-1974 phenomenon. 
 Eritrea's historical failure to give continuity to a state that had been established for over 
half a century under Italian colonial rule is in stark contrast to what happened elsewhere in the 
continent, including Libya and Somalia, the two other former Italian colonies (Araya 1990:79-
100).  There had been no consensus on what constituted Eritrean 'national self'.  The Ethio-
Eritrean "federation" of 1952-1962 was largely a compromise between the anti-Ethiopian 
movement, led and supported mainly by  Eritrean Moslems and the pro-Ethiopian movement, led 
and supported largely by Eritrean highland Christians. The collapse of the "federation" in 1962 
only reflected the fundamental weaknesses of the Eritrean nationalists rather than the 
manipulative role of Haile Selassie.  It is unlikely, indeed, that the Emperor could have 
successfully destroyed the "federation" had there been a solid intra-elite integration within 
Eritrea.   In a splendid analyses, supported by rich empirical evidence, Tekeste Negash (1997) 
and especially Zwede Retta (1999) have put the conspiracy theory of the "Guerilla Groupie" 
literature to final rest.  
 Analyses by various observers of post-"federation" period reinforce the argument that 
there is little historical evidence to support the existence of an Eritrean national consciousness. 
(Campell 1971:19-20; Holliday 1971:57-67; Erlich 1983)  The armed nationalist movement , 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) - which had emerged with the collapse of the "federation" - 
remained, both in leadership and support, predominantly Moslem; and the active involvement of 
the highland Christians in the anti-Ethiopian movement was - as in the past - essentially 
peripheral, and largely confined to a minority of educated urban youth.The few Christian 
elements involved were persecuted by the Moslem leadership as “Habasha”, "Kafir" - 
interchangeable terms for a traitor, an Ethiopian fifth column; and since the emergence of a 
Christian-dominated EPLF in Early 1970s, there had been periodic civil war between the two 
contending nationalist movements until 1981.  Indeed there is hardly any tangible evidence to 
support the argument that the reality of Eritrean nationhood in 1993 is a thing that developed, a 
product of enduring national identity, or of deep developmental forces of modernity. 
 At the outset, it can safely be argued that Eritrean nationalism - as a form of politics, a 
struggle to create an independent state - had indeed initially emerged as a reaction the enduring 
character of the Ethiopian modern state, but to capture its transition to mass-based nationalist 
phenomenon, we need - above and beyond a structural reductionist analysis - to theorize on 
specific post-1974 historical events that rendered the transition effective.  Indeed, the 
international political significance of Eritrean nationalism and the proliferation of scholarly 
literature on the subject can directly be traced to the post-1974 revolutionary period.  In what 
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follows, I will identify and analyze certain historically momentous post-1974 events whose 
combination had a transformative quality on the character of Eritrean nationalism, which 
otherwise had remained internally fragmented.  Finally, I will conclude by outlining the potential 
crises contesting, challenging, the hegemonic nationalist project of the current Eritrean 
leadership.  The historical events outlined below - although overlapping in reality - are treated 
separately  to attain analytical clarity; little attention is, therefore, given to any sense of 
chronological ranking. 
The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution 
 When the 1974 revolution broke out, it unleashed rising expectations among the various 
ethnic and regional elite groups in the country; it triggered - what is important to all social 
movements:  "cognitive liberation" - the notion that collective action could indeed transform the 
world (Calhoun 1997:129).  Indeed, it was during the revolutionary process that a variety of 
nationalist movements emerged in Ethiopia.  The structural opportunities opened up by the crisis 
of the Ethiopian State induced rebellion, especially among the urban younger generation of the 
intelligentsia, whose future prospects under the ancien regime had increasingly become dimmer.7  
The new political condition was even more enticing to the sons and daughters of the Christian 
Eritrean middle class - who had harbored resentment on the loss of Eritrean regional autonomy - 
as they encountered, for the first time in the history of Eritrea, the rise of a Christian-dominated 
nationalist movement .  With  the rise of the new Front and the collapse of the ancien regime, the 
belief in, and the idea of, imminent Eritrean independence began to captivate the urban Christian 
elements, who, otherwise, had remained marginal actors in the nationalist political drama, 
monopolized by the Moslems.  The socio-psychological impact of the revolutionary event on 
Eritrean nationalism can successfully be theorized. 
 
 
The Post-1974 Ethiopian Leadership 
 The ancien regime had been able to sustain Ethiopian nationalism in the Eritrean 
highlands by co-opting the old generation elite group.  The beneficiaries of  post-“federation” 
Eritrea-particularly in administration and education-were mainly Christians. 
 The regime also employed ideological method by constantly propagating the fear of 
'Islamic encirclement', helped by past history and Eritrea's geographical proximity to the Islamic 
World.  It was able to organize Israeli-trained commandos, mainly Eritrean Christians, to fight 
ELF; and the Eritrean police and security forces were mainly local Christians. 
 The death of General Aman Andom was a momentous historical event in the Ethio-
Eritrean experience.  Although we may never know whether he could have successfully 
addressed the Eritrean question, it is, however, a common knowledge that his visit to Asmara 
was popular; especially the Christian highlanders saw it as the return of the prodigal son, while, 
interestingly, the Fronts perceived it as a threat, a destabilizing force. 
 The subsequent government policy of all out political and military repression bears the 
major responsibility for alienating, especially the Eritrean Christian highlanders; describing the 
immediate consequences of the repressive measures employed by the new government in 1970's, 
a French journalist (Lefort 1983:147) had this to report: 
The frightening carnage…drove the 'modern' elites in Eritrea 
(university and secondary students, civil servants, cadres and 
technicians) to join the guerillas en masse.  After the battle of 
Asmara, most of the Eritrean forces which had managed as best 
they could to stay at an equal distance from the Fronts and the 
central government, swung over to the nationalist camp. 
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According to some observers (Erlic 1983:16), the number of Eritrean guerrilla fighters until 1974 
was no more than 2,500, but by early 1977 the estimate ranged between 38,500 and 43,000. 
Indeed, the growing influence of Christian elements in the field began to be felt only after the 
1974 revolution, and the phenomenon of war refugees from Christian highland Eritrea had hardly 
been experienced previously.  Major military offensives were repeatedly conducted by the 
government, including urban terror against Eritrean youth.  The war claimed the lives of 
thousands of Eritreans; the scale of social dislocation and destruction of property, were immense 
- with no analogous example under the reign of Haile Selassie. Describing the devastating effects 
of the war, an old Eritrean woman is said to have remarked: "Even the stones are burning” 
(Pateman 1990:179). 
 After her experience living under six months of bloody war, a Croat woman  journalist 
(Drakulic 1993:51-52)- for whom being a Croat had no special meaning in the past - wrote: 
…being Croat has become my destiny… in this war I am defined 
by my nationality, and by it alone… Along with millions of other 
Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood… That is what the 
war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation… 
Where as before I was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, 
my character and, yes, my nationality too, now I feel stripped of all 
that.  I am nobody because I am not a person any more.  I am one 
of 4.5 million Croats. 
 
…I am not in a position to choose any longer.  Nor, I think is 
anyone else…. one doesn't have to succumb voluntarily to this 
ideology of the nation - one is sucked into it. 
 
There is indeed a striking similarity to what happened to the Eritrean experience in post-1974 
Ethiopia.  The sustained war and political repression had a transformative quality on the Eritrean 
nationalist politics - rendering it, for the first time, a real national dimension.  In the past, the 
nationalist politics had to face enduring difficulties in socially constructing an all-encompassing 
Eritrean identity; what Anderson (1991) called the "imagined community" had for decades 
remained elusive to the Eritrean nationalists.  But in the face of the post-1974 government policy 
of total repression, almost every Eritrean, Moslem or Christian, was - like the Croat journalist - 
pinned to the wall of nationhood.  The popular referendum outcome for independence was 
indeed reflective of such momentous historical event.  It is imperative that the repressive 
behavior of the Ethiopian state be theorized as a specific historical event of post-1974, rather 
than as an inevitable product of the Ethiopian modern state per se - hence, the necessity of cross-
historical comparison of the state under Haile Selassie and the Dergue regarding the Eritrean 
question. 
The Rise of New Eritrean Leadership 
 Cross-historical comparison on the role of leadership in the modern political history of 
Eritrea clearly indicates that the emergence of EPLF was indeed a watershed. 
 Despite its longer history of existence, ELF was highly marked by enduring ideological 
and organizational crises to assume the role of an effective national leadership (Medhane 1986); 
its 'pan-Islamic' ideology had no appeal outside the Moslem population in Eritrea; it never 
attained international sympathy beyond the Arab world; and organizationally, it was undermined 
by recurring sectarian politics; its final military defeat  in 1981 was only  the culmination of its 
gradual decline that had begun since its inception.  By way of contrast, EPLF had a secular 
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ideology, a unified leadership,8 an immense capacity for political mobilization, and had carefully 
cultivated international image, effectively publicizing in the Western world the image of 
victimized Eritrea. 
 In its struggle to overcome religious division that had haunted the Eritrean nationalists for 
decades, the new leadership stressed the value of cultural autonomy within the context of a 
multi-ethnic Eritrea;  the various ethnic groups were treated as nationalities rather than religious 
communities.  Through literacy campaign and cultural activities, the politics of diversity in the 
context of Eritrean unity was advanced as a new instrument of nation-building. 
 Although it advocated the rhetoric of class struggle and socialism, in practice it was a 
populist movement - engaged in controlled social reforms from above in areas of land reform 
and gender issues; political rather than social mobilization was the main instrument employed. 
 Through its internal security mechanism - "Halawe Sawra," defender of the revolution - 
EPLF was able to create a hierarchical and disciplined military organization of formidable 
historical significance.  It initiated and penetrated civic associations of urban workers, peasants, 
women and youth; in the rural liberated areas, it provided public services such as health and 
education.  Through its relief organization, the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), it played a 
significant role at the height of the social dislocation and famine within Eritrea; and In that area, 
EPLF had earned international admiration. 
 Its political and military strategies were radically a new approach in the modern history 
of Eritrean nationalist politics.  It destabilized the central government by recruiting, supporting, 
opposition forces within Ethiopia, and establishing military alliances.   
 In the modern political history of Eritrea, the role of EPLF was certainly a new 
phenomenon; and it is not, therefore, without historical foundation when Eritrean supporters 
regard the leader, Issais Afewerki, as the George Washington of Eritrea, who has delivered what 
had in the past seemed utterly impossible: the Eritrean Nation-state. 
The Emergence of an Allied Political Movement 
 The emergence in 1975 of an armed ethno-nationalist movement (Young 1997) in the 
northern part of Ethiopia, bordering Eritrea, was no less a catalyst in strengthening the Eritrean 
nationalist politics.  The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) from the province of 
predominantly Christian Tigray, had specific supportive functions that could be cited and 
elaborated.  It embraced the Eritrean nationalist political agenda, established a military buffer 
zone between the central government and the Eritrean nationalists - rendering the latter a much 
needed political as well as military space; it provided critical military support for EPLF against 
the latter's deadly enemies: the ELF within Eritrea and the central government in Ethiopia.  The 
military defeat of the former in 1981 by the combined forces of the two Christian allies, 
produced  - for the first time in the modern political history of Eritrea - a single and unified 
nationalist leadership, organized around EPLF.  The sustained military victory over the heavily 
armed central government, backed by the Soviet Union, brought EPLF popularity, as the 
defender of Eritreans against a brutal regime; and its project for an independent Eritrea 
increasingly became, in the eyes of the population, not only desirable but also believable.  There 
is rich empirical evidence to substantiate the thesis advanced in this section. 
The Collapse of an Alternative Social Discourse 
 There were in Ethiopia radical political movements that advanced an alternative political 
discourse to that of the nationalist movements and the central government.  They advocated class 
struggle - over what they called narrow nationalism or national chauvinism - and 
democratization.  Between 1975 and 1978, however, those movements were violently attacked 
not only by the government at the center - for whom the Ethiopian territorial integrity was a 
primary concern - but also by  the nationalist movements in the northern peripheries, (Markakis 
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1990; Tiruneh 1992)  for whom the radicals seemed to pose real or imagined ideological threat. 
Under the combined violence of the government and the nationalists, the radical movements 
soon collapsed.  In any political struggle, victory over the battle of ideas is a pre-condition for 
success.  Although we may never know the outcome, had the radical movements survived, their 
demise seems to have rendered the ideology of the nationalists and that of the central 
government ample space to assume a dominant status in the sphere of public discourse.  Since 
the collapse of the radical movements, the public discourse was dominated, monopolized, by the 
two competing ideologies.  The specifics of the correlation especially between the decline of the 
radicals' ideological discourse and the ascendancy of the Nationalists' needs further empirical 
investigation. 
The Post--1974 Geo-Politics 
 In the Ethio-Eritrean experience, Ethiopia's post-1974 alliance with the Eastern 
Communist Bloc was no less a momentous historical event that transformed the nature of 
Eritrean nationalist politics.  The Western world which had been in the past behind Ethiopia, 
now turned its support to the nationalist forces in the northern peripheries.  Mark Duffield and 
John Pendergast (1994) have offered us rare insights into the range and complexity of support 
given by Western governments, NGOs , and other international agencies, under the cover of 
humanitarian intervention. The massive humanitarian intervention especially after 1983 was not 
politically entirely neutral: It freed the nationalists to focus on their political, military, activities.  
Members of various NGOs assumed the role of an advocate for the Eritrean cause in the Western 
world - popularizing it and at the same time undermining the image of the Ethiopian government 
- hence, the sudden proliferation in 1980s of grass-root support groups for Eritrea all over the 
Western world.  Here too, there is rich empirical evidence to support the argument.  The critical 
supporting role of the border country, Sudan, the human rights foreign policy of Carter's 
administration, the Reagan and Thatcher foreign policy revolution, need theorizing. 
The Post-Independent Eritrean State 
 The leaders of EPLF have indeed made an Eritrean state, but have they made Eritreans?9  
How internally solid, and enduring is Eritrean national identity?  That question is no less 
legitimate in any inquiry of Nations, nationhood, and nationalism. 
 Erick Hobsbawn (1992:123) remarks: 
Men and women did not choose collective identification as they 
choose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a 
time.  They had, and still have, several attachments and loyalties 
simultaneously, including nationality, and are simultaneously 
concerned with various aspects of life, any of which may at any 
one time be foremost in their minds, as occasion suggests. 
 
Nationalists appeal, the critic (Hobsbawn 1992:177) continues, 
Crumbles as the national cause is identified not with the generalities, but with 
much more divisive specifics:  not with [to cite examples] Israel in general, but 
with the policies of Begin, Shamir or Sharon…; not with Flemishness as against 
Frenchness but with specific Flemish party. 
 
Indeed, especially after the recent Ethio-Eritrean war, the question in post-independent Eritrea 
has increasingly come to deal not with Eritreanism in general but with the EPLF  leadership in 
particular.  As Africa Confidential (23 February 2001:1) reports: 
For the first time in his political life, President Issayas Aferworki faces serious 
challenges from his political peers. There is now a substantial group within the 
 9 
ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) that is dissatisfied with 
his leadership.  This results mainly from the war with Ethiopia and from 
stonewalling on political reform.  It has been getting harder for Asmara to dismiss 
the growing band of critics of Issayas as tools of Ethiopian intelligence and a 
spate of sackings and resignations at the apex of the regime indicates a new 
degree of discontent.  Outside government, critics are increasingly strident.  For 
now, Issayas will weather the storm: he's set to win any leadership contest and 
face down any rivals this year.  Yet the political climate is growing chillier and 
the President's options are narrowing. 
 
The fault lines in the Nationalist's hegemony have indeed taken various manifestations.10  The 
national economy is hard hit with thousands dislocated due to the war; the old intra-elite 
cleavage between Christians and Moslems is far from being resolved; the Moslem faction in the 
opposition group perceive EPLF as a Christian power.  No one seems to  doubt the fundamental 
weakness of Eritrean national identity more than Issais himself; the leadership’s obsessive 
concern - above and beyond everything else - for unity is clearly indicative.   A close reading of 
the specific policies - such as dividing the territory into six administrative zones, the control of 
religious freedom, regulation of laws regarding elections and formation of multi-parties - 
underline the fact that the so-called Eritrean national unity remains at best a project and not yet a 
historical fact, with its fate open-ended.  The introduction of democracy, for all we know, may be 
poisonous to the very survival of Eritrea as a nation-state.  The George Washington of Eritrea 
seems to have understood that potential danger, as he has singularly taken it to himself to save 
the country; but his approach remains no less problematic. 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has tried to advance two interrelated theoretical claims: nationalism is best 
understood as a contingent event, and that it could hardly claim a monopoly status in history.  I 
have - al be it in a rather sketchy form - tried to support those arguments through a close reading 
of the Eritrean experience in the modern political history of Ethiopia. 
 
 
                                                          
NOTES 
 
1
 My entire theoretical framework of analysis is indebted to the insights contained in Brubaker, 1996. 
2
 Hastings, 1997, for example, argues that nationalism is a pre-modern phenomenon. 
3
 For a sustained critique, see Brubaker, 1996. 
4
 The reader may consult the following works which are representative: Connell, 1997; Davidson and 
Clife, 1990; Habte Selassie, 1980; Gebre-Medhin, 1989; Pateman, 1990. 
5
 On power as essentially a social relations and the significance of human agency in history see Smith, 
1977. 
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6
 A "Political fiction" because "the members of even the smallest nation will  never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them" (Benedict Anderson, 1991) 
7
 For insightful analysis about the role of the petite Bourgeoisie in the Ethiopian revolution see Grey 
1987:118-129. 
8
 For more information, the reader may consult Markakis, 1990. 
9
 Employing in the Eritrean context Massimo d'Azeglio's famous statement on Italian unification - "We 
have made Italy, now we have to make Italians," quoted in Hobsbawm 1992:44. 
10
 For more information, see Araya 2000:107-126. 
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